Suchergebnisse

Regimes are harder to establish in the security area than they are in the economic realm because of the inherently competitive cast of many security concerns, the unforgiving nature of the problems, and the difficulty in determining how much security the state has or needs. Nevertheless, there is at least one example of a functioning security regime—the Concert of Europe. Under the Concert the great powers sharply moderated their individualistic and competitive policies and exercised restraint in the expectation that others would reciprocate. The self-interest that they followed was broader and longer-run than usual. The Balance of Power, however, is a regime only if the restraints are internal, as Kaplan implies, as contrasted with Waltz's formulation in which states restrain each other. Current superpower relations should not be considered a regime because the principles, rules, and norms have little autonomy but instead can be best understood as quite direct reflections of the states' power and interests.

This article introduces a novel concept, humanitarian security regimes, and enquires under what conditions they arise and what is distinctive about them. Humanitarian security regimes are driven by altruistic imperatives aiming to prohibit and restrict behaviour, impede lethal technology or ban categories of weapons through disarmament treaties; they embrace humanitarian perspectives that seek to prevent civilian casualties, precluding harmful behavior, protecting and ensuring the rights of victims and survivors of armed violence. The article explores how these regimes appear in the security area, usually in opposition to the aspirations of the most powerful states. The existing regimes literature has mostly taken a functional approach to analyzing cooperation, lacks a humanitarian hypothesis and does not explore the emergence of new regimes in the core area of security. The author argues that in the processes of humanitarian security regime-making, it is the national interest that is restructured to incorporate new normative understandings that then become part of the new national security aspirations. This article intends to fill this gap and its importance rests on three reasons. First, security areas that were previously considered to be the exclusive domain of states have now been the focus of change by actors beyond the state. Second, states have embraced changes to domains close to their national security (e.g. arms) mostly cognizant of humanitarian concerns. Third, states are compelled to re-evaluate their national interests motivated by a clear humanitarian impetus. Three conditions for the emergence of humanitarian security regimes are explained: marginalization and delegitimization; multilevel agency, and reputational concerns. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

More than three decades after the concept of international regimes was introduced, the study of why and how states may choose to cooperate, particularly around security, remains contested. While the field has evolved considerably over that time, there remain significant puzzles in the literature concerning the emergence of different types of security regimes. We aim to address these issues by developing the concept of a tacit security regime (TSR) literature. We define a TSR as an interest-based, limited, and informal mechanism of cooperation between states for the purpose of deconflicting their respective interests over a specific security issue. We illustrate the usefulness of our concept in the two contemporary cases of Russian-Israeli and Russian-Turkish security cooperation over the Syrian crisis (2015-2018).

"Security Regimes: Collective Security and Security Communities" published on by Oxford University Press.

A security regime is an uneasy compromise where the relationship among the parties is generally undefined, limited in scope, & transitional. The relationship is undefined, because the parties are usually former adversaries who, for the moment, do not think of war as a feasible or practical, or, under some conditions, even a possible instrument. Yet they are far from being allies. A security regime differs in important ways from an alliance or a security community. A security regime is also limited. What happens inside the regime is only a part of what happens in the larger relationship. Participation in a regime does not imply clear behavioral expectations outside the security arena. Finally, the parties to a security regime are usually in a transitional relationship; although the parties have moved away from a full-scale adversarial relationship, where they are going is less clear. Security regimes do not develop in a linear sequence to become 'security communities'. Adapted from the source document.

THE OLD EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM IS BREAKING DOWN. A NEW SECURITY REGIME IS EVOLVING, BUT THE TRANSITION WILL EXPOSE SOVIET VULNERABILITIES. IN ORDER TO PLACATE MOSCOW'S FEARS, THE NEW SECURITY SYSTEM MUST INTEGRATE THE USSR INTO EUROPE. ADAPTING TO THE ACCELERATING CHANGES IN EUROPE WILL REQUIRE THE WEST TO JETTISON THE INTELLECTUAL CONSTRUCTS THAT UNDERPINNED THE SECURITY POLICIES OF THE COLD WAR.